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RELIANCE ON EXPERTS FROM A
CORPORATE LAW PERSPECTIVE
ALEXANDROS N. ROKAS*

In discharging their duty of care, directors of corporations are not
expected to independently investigate all parameters affecting a decision
they are about to make. In fact, statutory provisions encourage or
sometimes requiredirectors to seek the advice of experts, such as auditors,
lawyers, investment bankers, and tax specialists. In this Article, emphasis
is placed on Section 141(e) of the Delaware General Corporation Law,
according to which directors are entitled to rely on the advice of such
experts as long as they believe that the advice was within the expert's
professionalcompetence, the expert was selected with reasonablecare, and
reliance is in good faith. Apart from systematizing the elements of this
rule, as they were interpreted by a significant number of court decisions,
this Article sheds light on the interaction of the reliance defense with basic
concepts of Delaware corporate law, mainly the businessjudgment rule, as
well as goodfaith, after Caremark. This Article does not examine whether
directors will be eventually held liable (which, besides, is rarely the case in
Delaware due to the business judgment presumption, exculpatory clauses,
and insurance and indemnification provisions), but solely whether the
additionaldefense of Section 141(e) should apply or not.

* LL.M., HarvardLaw School, Fulbrightand Onassis Scholar, 2011-12; Ph.D.,
Humboldt University ofBerlin; LL.B., University ofAthens, admitted in Athens,
Greece. The author would like to thank Professor Reinier H. Kraakman and the
participants of the Comparative Corporate Governance Seminar for their constructive
feedback and comments.
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INTRODUCTION: PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION-MAKERS
AND CORPORATE LAW

Decision-making is often a painful process. Decision-makers face
various challenges, ranging from lack of factual data or incapacity to
critically assess the available data to an unwillingness to undertake
responsibility or personal conflicts of interest. Many challenges appear in
periods of uncertainty, such as during financial and other crises. In such
periods, decision-makers would feel extremely relieved if somebody else
could bear the burden and offer an answer to whatever dilemma they are
facing. They would feel even more comfortable if they knew that relying
on this advice would remove the burden of responsibility, in case the
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advice proves to be wrong.'
To be sure, feeling more secure is not per se harmful. However, turning
the decision-making process into a process of uncritical adoption of a thirdparty's view could seriously distort the intellectual element involved in this
process. Even if the advice is sound, decision-makers may not be able to
oversee the implementation of their decision in the future and will fail to
adjust their strategy in the absence of the advisor. In fact, a relatively
recent empirical experiment examined the neurobiological processes of
making financial decisions with and without expert advice, especially
under conditions of enhanced uncertainty.2 It showed that areas of the
brain responsible for making value judgments, accessible through Magnetic
Resonance Imaging ("MRI") technology, were clearly less active when
such advice was received. This result was not affected by the fact that the
financial advisor's suggestions were very conservative and, thus, could not
lead to maximum earnings.3 The researchers did not examine what caused
this behavior; however, one could speculate that the feeling of safety,
created by the presence of the (perceived) authority, coupled with the
surrounding conditions of uncertainty, and sometimes the laziness of
decision-makers, led them to offload the responsibility for making financial
decisions. A similar experiment, concentrating on brain activities when
choosing and changing financial advisors, concluded that detecting errors
of advisors is more likely when the recipients of the advice consider
changing their advisors.4 According to the researchers, in the absence of
such circumstances, recipients observe more the personal characteristics of
the advisors, and less the numerical realities.
The most prominent personal characteristic of the advisors is their ability
to convey trust. This seemed to be the case, for instance, with the
relationship of members of various Wisconsin school boards and David W.
Noack, who, in 2006, convinced them to borrow more than $160 million
1. Of course, in most cases the latter is not possible because the one suffering the
consequences of incorrect advice is the decision-maker himself. A patient trusting his
doctor would damage his health if the medication the doctor provided is improper. In
the case of fiduciaries, though, decisions affect third persons. Corporations form the
most prominent example because directors administrate "other people's money," an
expression introduced in LuIs BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How BANKERS
USE IT (1914).
2. See Jan B. Engelmann et al., Expert Financial Advice Neurobiologically
"Offloads" Financial Decision-Making under Risk, PLOS ONE (Mar. 24, 2009),

http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi%2F 10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0004957.
3. See id.
4. Russell N. James III, Choosing and Changing FinancialAdvisors: An fMRI
Study of Associated Brain Activations I (Working Paper, Feb. 27, 2012), available at

http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228293349 Choosing-and ChangingFinanci
alAdvisorsAn_fMRIStudy of AssociatedBrain Activations.
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and contribute $35 million of their own money to purchase synthetic
collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs") sold by the Royal Bank of Canada
("RBC"). Noack, apart from being an investment banker who provided
decades-worth of services to the schools, was also the son of a teacher who
taught at a local school for forty-seven years, while all of his children
attended local schools. With regard to the investment, Noack stated that
6
"[t]here would need to be 15 Enrons" for the schools to lose money.
At the same time, some of the challenges mentioned at the beginning of
this Article were present. First, due to the complexity of the proposed
investment, the board members lacked sufficient knowledge to
independently assess its details. One of the members, who was a financial
advisor himself, admitted he never read the thick packets of documents he
received, claiming that he was not worried because the board had its
questions satisfactorily answered by Noack. Second, Noack's company,
Stifel, Nicolaus & Company ("Stifel"), had close ties with RBC. Finally,
board members never examined the advisor's qualifications relating to such
investments, which were in fact limited. This confirms the trust element of
the board's relationship to Noack.7 The rest of the story is more or less
predictable: the CDOs lost most of their value, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") charged Stifel and RBC with fraudulent
misconduct.8
Corporate boards, like school boards, consist of fiduciaries entrusted
with the administration of an estate. However, they more often have to
reach investment decisions or decisions on other complicated issues that
require an expert's advice. On the other hand, corporate board members
tend to be more qualified than school board members for such purposes,
and a substantial body of statutory provisions facilitates the decisionmaking process. In this Article, emphasis is given to corporate law
provisions enabling corporate board members under certain conditions to
trust their advisors and escape liability should the advice prove to be
mistaken. After explaining the reasoning behind the relevant rules in
Delaware law (Section I), this Article unfolds all elements included in the
relevant provision (Section II), as well as further requirements set by case
law and recommended by scholars (Section III). Final conclusions are
5. See Charles Duhigg & Carter Dougherty, The Reckoning: From Midwest to
MT.A.,

Pain

From

Global

Gamble,

N.Y.

TIMES

(Nov.

1,

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/02/business/02global.html?pagewanted=all.

2008),

6. Id.

7. Id. Of course, it was not only trust that led to the board's decision. CDOs were
quite popular at that time, and the particular CDOs received satisfactory ratings.
8. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges RBC Capital Markets in Sale of
Unsuitable CDO Investments to Wisconsin School Districts (Sept. 27, 2011), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-191.htm.
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offered at the end of this Article.
I.

THE RULE AND ITS JUSTIFICATION

In Delaware, the key provision enabling boards to rely on their advisors
is Section 141(e) of the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL"),
which states:
A member of the board of directors, or a member of any committee
designated by the board of directors, shall, in the performance of such
member's duties, be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the
records of the corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports
or statements presented to the corporation by any of the corporation's
officers or employees, or committees of the board of directors, or by any
other person as to matters the member reasonably believes are within
such other person's professional or expert competence and who has been
selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.9
The legislative history of Section 141(e) shows that its initial version, as
adopted in 1943, did not encompass all categories of outside experts, but
only public accountants and appraisers.10 In fact, it took some decades for
the state legislators to broaden the language of the provision: in 1974,
Section 35 of the Model Corporation Act was amended to include all sorts
of experts."
Subsequently, many states (including Delaware in 1987)
adopted similar provisions."
Even before 1974, directors throughout the United States relied on
outside advisors, and courts recognized this reliance as a factor that must be
considered in assessing good faith. For example, in 1936, the Michigan
Supreme Court (applying Delaware law) dealt with the case of a director
who, based on advice provided by his counsel, approved certain dividends,
rendering the company insolvent. 3 The legality of the dividends was
questionable because they were declared from monies received from the

9. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14 1(e) (2010). There is a similar provision in Section
172, regulating the reliance on experts with regard to "facts pertinent to the existence
and amount of surplus or other funds from which dividends might properly be declared

and paid." See id. § 172.

10. See 44 Del. Laws 423 (1943) (stating that a director "shall in the performance
of his duties be fully protected in relying in good faith upon . . . reports made to the

corporation by any of its officials, or by an independent certified public accountant, or
by an appraiser selected with reasonable care by the Board of Directors").
11. Report of Committee on Corporate Laws: Changes in the Model Business
CorporationAct, 30 Bus. LAW. 501 (1974-75).
12. See 66 Del. Laws 335 (1987); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN., § 8.30, at 8-207
(2011).

13. See Stratton v. Anderson, 270 N.W. 764, 764 (Mich. 1936).
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sale of certain territorial franchise rights. 14 The court did not hesitate to
adopt a broad exception to liability, stating that evidence proving advice
"not only ... negat[es] any bad faith upon the part of defendant in voting
for the dividend following the receipt of this advice, but it [also] sanctions
a finding by us that such vote was made in good faith and without
negligence."15 Facts indicating reliance were taken into account by courts
in numerous cases outside corporate law-ranging from criminal to tax
cases-as elements supporting good faith. 16
Behind this finding lies a basic justification of the reliance doctrine,
namely that it is in accordance with the principles of prudent decisionmaking. The above-mentioned decisions support the view that even in the
absence of a reliance provision, reliance is a fact to be taken into account to
determine whether directors acted with due care and in good faith.'7
Generally, seeking advice indicates a reasonable effort of the director to
become informed and gain the necessary familiarity with complicated facts
in the course of the decision-making process. Reliance does not contradict
the business judgment rule. One of the requirements of this rule is to reach
informed decisions. This is generally deemed to be satisfied when the
director consults and relies on outside professionals.

8

The argument for reliance provisions invites us to admit that directors
are not capable of independently assessing all relevant and available facts
or personally contacting every officer and employee in order to become
informed. Solely reading written reports of the various divisions of the
corporation would require an enormous amount of time, especially in large

14. See id. at 766-67.
15. Id. at 767; see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985). See
generally Thomas L. Preston, Advice of Counsel as a Defense, 28 VA. L. REv. 26
(1941).
16. See Douglas W. Hawes & Thomas J. Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Counsel
as a Defense in Corporateand Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REv. 1, 9-11 (1976).

17. One would expect that common law countries would not include reliance
provisions, leaving the interpretation of duty of care issues to the courts. While the
United States, Australia (see infra note 63), and New Zealand have such provisions,
Germany and other civil law countries do not. Recently, the German Federal Court of
Justice ("BGH") set the conditions under which boards can rely on legal advisors based
on the general duty of care provision. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of
Justice] Sept. 20, 2011, II ZR 234/09. These conditions are quite similar to the ones
detailed in this Article, while the legal literature (before the decision was issued)
regularly refer to relevant U.S. concepts. See, e.g., Holger Fleischer, Vertrauen von
Geschaftsleitern und

Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern auf Informationen Dritter, 30

ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 1397 (2009).
18. See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, § 4.01(c) cmt. b, 171
(1994); see also Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (noting that "gross negligence" is the
appropriate standard to apply when evaluating whether directors were adequately
informed in reaching a business judgment).
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corporations. "Directors would be snowed under with paper," as one
commentator puts it, while directorship would become an extremely
hazardous job. 19 In such corporations, the hierarchy structure and the
distinct roles assigned are crucial factors affecting the efficiency and the
pace of decision-making. Roles are usually assigned in accordance with
the significance of decisions, which brings to mind again certain duty of
care interpretations, according to which the importance of the business
judgment to be made is a factor affecting the reasonable investigation
directors are required to perform.20 Therefore, by providing a safe harbor,
directors and officers are encouraged to introduce such organizational
structures that expedite and rationalize the decision-making process, while
at the same time honoring their duty of care.21
On the other hand, critics could allege that reliance provisions encourage
wrongful conduct, motivating directors to shield themselves behind the
advice given without actually familiarizing themselves with the decision to
be made or, even worse, knowing its negative aspects. Reliance provisions
may even incentivize directors to shop for favorable advice. 22 However, as
Section 141(e) implies, and as will be explained below, courts should
consider all factors calling into question the good faith of the decisionmakers. Thus, rejecting unfavorable advice could indicate bad faith,
excluding the application of the rule. The mere fact that the board hired an
advisor and adopted his views does not constitute an absolute defense when
good faith is questioned. To the extent that Section 141(e) excuses
negligent behavior, as will be explained below, criticism is justified.23
II. STATUTORY ELEMENTS OF THE RULE

A. Stricto Sensu Reliance
The first element of the reliance doctrine is self-explanatory: there is no
reliance and the directors will not enjoy the protection of Section 141(e) if
they do not follow the advice provided in all its material aspects. 24
19. Robert W. Hamilton, Reliance and Liability Standardfor Outside Directors,24
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 5, 19 (1989).
20. Id.
21. R. Franklin Balotti & Megan W. Shaner, Safe Harborfor Officer Reliance:
Comparing the Approaches of the Model Business CorporationAct and Delaware's
General CorporationLaw, 74 J. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 170 (2011) (referring to
officers).
22. See Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 16, at 8.
23. See infra Section III.A.
24. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262 (Del. 2000); Ash v. McCall, No. Civ.
A. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341, at *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000); Hawes & Sherrard,
supra note 16, at 35; Thomas A. Uebler, ReinterpretingSection 141(e) of Delaware's
General Corporation Law: Why Interested Directors Should Be Fully Protected in
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Directors are not required to accept the recommendations of the experts;
however, if they do not follow the advice, they will not be able to invoke
the protection of Section 141(e). Regardless, unless gross negligence is
proven, directors are still shielded by the business judgment presumption,
since the latter is a broader shield for directors and applies even when
Section 141(e) is inapplicable.2 5 Consequently, not following the advice
does not necessarily indicate bad faith or negligence, but merely excludes
the applicability of the reliance doctrine.26 Seen from this perspective, the
Delaware Court of Chancery in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation
misinterprets Section 141(e) in saying that:
[a]n interpretation of Section 141(e) that would require boards to follow
the advice of experts (substantially? completely? in part?) before being
able to claim reliance on those experts would be in conflict with the
mandate in Section 141(a) that the corporation is to be managed 'by or
under the direction of a board of directors.' 27
There are cases, where, for various reasons, following the advice of
experts is not a simple task. Such cases occur when a legal opinion
concludes that a particular course of action is "more likely permissible than
not," 28 when it provides for more than one option, or when the recipient of
the advice fails to understand the means of its implementation. In these
instances, what matters is the director's effort to make sure his actions
comply with the advice and, if necessary, ask for further explanation. If he
fails to do so, reliance will not be granted.
B. Reliance in Good Faith
Without the requirement of good faith, reliance provisions would be a
shelter for incompetent or even dishonest directors to hide behind the
advice of an outside advisor. Good faith is a broad concept that refers
mainly to the state of mind of the directors who claim reliance. Therefore,
by definition, it covers most cases of dishonest directors. The violation of
the good faith requirement does not lead to director liability, but only to the
inapplicability of the reliance doctrine.
The general notion applies that a conscious (or intentional) disregard of

Relying on Expert Advice, 65 Bus. LAW. 1023, 1045 (2010).
25. Ash, 2000 WL 1370341, at *9 ("[A board of directors] is entitled to the

presumption that it exercised proper business judgment, including proper reliance on
experts."); see also infra Section III.A.4.ii.
26. Contra Hawes & Sherrard, supranote 16, at 35.

27. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 770 n.550 (Del. Ch.

2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
28. See Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 16, at 33.
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the director's duties constitutes bad faith. The Model Business Corporation
Act ("MBCA") entitles a director who does not have "knowledge that
makes reliance unwarranted" to rely on experts. 29 Even though there is no
reference to the concept of good faith, the MBCA's requirement is largely
equivalent to the good faith requirement, perhaps with a stronger emphasis
on the subjective elements of the director's behavior. 30 An example of
knowledge that would make reliance unwarranted is being aware of facts
that contradict the findings of the expert.3' For example, there is a lack of
good faith if the director knows-due to his personal expertise or due to a
tip provided by an employee-that the advice is shoddy, or if he adopts
only favorable advice and rejects other experts' opinions.32 In such cases,
the director should disclose these facts to the rest of the board according to
MBCA Section 8.30(c). 33 Other instances of bad faith will be discussed
later in this Article.34

29. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(e). But see N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(a)

(McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2013) ("[A director] shall not be considered to be acting in
good faith if he has knowledge concerning the matter in question that would cause such
reliance to be unwarranted.").
30. The content of good faith, in particular whether it encompasses only subjective
or also objective components is a disputed issue. See E. Norman Veasey & Christine
T. DiGuglielmo, What Happened in Delaware CorporateLaw and Governancefrom
1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1399,
1452-53 (2005).
31. See Hamilton, supra note 19, at 21.
32. See In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 16415, 2004 WL
1305745, at *38-43 (Del. Ch. June 4, 2004) (holding-without citing Section 141(e)-

that a director possessing special financial expertise did not reasonably rely on a
fairness opinion, because he had very strong reasons to suspect that the price was unfair
and that he should not vote in favor of the proposed transaction). Corporations hire
skilled directors to take advantage of their expertise. In another decision, the same
court concludes that even "board members who are experts are fully protected under §
141(e) in relying in good faith on the opinions and statements of the corporation's
officers and employees who were responsible for preparing the company's financial
statements," adding that plaintiffs should "plead with particularity facts that would lead
to the reasonable inference that the director defendants made or allowed to be made any
false statements or material omissions with knowledge or in bad faith." In re Citigroup
Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 135 (Del. Ch. 2009). This concept is
rather confusing; one should conclude, however, that even after Citigroup, courts

should examine the good faith of skilled directors and take into account their particular
qualifications and exposure.
33. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(c) ("In discharging board or committee
duties a director shall disclose . . . to the other board or committee members

information not already known by them but known by the director to be material to the
discharge of their decision-making or oversight functions. . .
34. See infra Section III.A.
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ReasonableBelief That the Advice Was Within the Expert's
ProfessionalCompetence

The language of Section 141(e) shows that the rule applies even if the
expert opines on a subject not within his area of competence as long as the
director reasonably believes the opposite (and the rest of the provision's
requirements apply). This will occur only in extreme cases because
reasonableness must be assessed in an objective manner-that is, based on
material information that was reasonably available about the expert.
In assessing whether there is a reasonable belief that an expert acts
within his professional competence, all factors should be taken into
consideration. For instance, a lawyer would be suitable to opine on
technical issues of environmental compliance if he specializes in
environmental law or if he is member of a legal organization with access to
relevant information and it is not the first time he deals with compliance.3 6
In the case of Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enterprises,the Delaware Court of

Chancery considered an investment banker suitable to assess the value of
net operating losses ("NOLs") and to explain the consequences of a
potential sale. 37 The court placed emphasis on the fact that the Board had
"ample cause to consider him an expert qualified to speak on Selectica's
NOLs and on the threat of their impairment," taking into account inter alia
his work history as a tax attorney and partner at several accounting firms. 38
On the other hand, a lawyer is generally not the appropriate person to opine
on questions of fact, such as valuation and fairness issues.39 In such cases,
there should be two opinions, one for the facts, and one for the legal issues
based on the facts presented in the first opinion.
D.

Selection with Reasonable Care

The requirement of reasonably believing that the advice is within the
expert's professional competence and the requirement of selecting the
expert with reasonable care are partially interchangeable as a careful
selection excludes experts that the director believes are incompetent. Apart
from that, a careful selection process should eliminate experts that are not
35. See Uebler, supra note 24, at 1042 ("objective reasonableness").
36. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30, at 8-204.
37. See Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., No. 4241-VCN, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS, at
*50 (Mar. 1, 2010).
3 8. Id.

39. See Glassberg v. Boyd, 116 A.2d 711, 719 (Del. Ch. 1955); see also Valeant
Pharms. Int'l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 751 (Del. Ch. 2007) (acknowledging that

outside legal advisors can opine on whether a proposed transaction will be subject to
the entire fairness test and on the possible outcomes of the test, but not on the actual
substantive fairness of the proposal); Bevis Longstreth, Reliance on Advice of Counsel
as a Defense to Securities Law Violations, 37 Bus. LAW. 1185, 1194 (1982).
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reliable due to factors of personal nature. Such factors relate to the bias of
the advisors, and, secondarily, to instances of frivolous or unprofessional
behavior on the part of the expert. This Section will mainly cover conflict
of interest issues as competence issues are discussed above.40
Conflicts of interest arise primarily when the independence and
objectivity of the expert are questionable. An obvious example: in the
context of leveraged buy-outs ("LBOs"), allowing the acquirer to select an
appraiser for a solvency opinion can easily render the selection process
flawed.4 1 Similarly, if Company X is about to acquire substantial assets of
Company Y, the director of Y, who also owns X, is not suited to appoint
the advisor to this transaction. 42 The mere fact that management selected
the advisor, though, is insufficient to prove a conflict of interest. 43 If
management had a conflicting interest in the transaction that is known to
the board, directors should avoid trusting their advisors. For example, in
Valeant PharmaceuticalsInternational v. Jerney, the Delaware Court of

Chancery examined the fairness of bonuses paid to former directors and
officers after a spin-off of a division of the company.4 4 The board of
directors instructed the compensation committee to select a particular
advisor, who had already issued an opinion favoring the award of bonuses,
instead of selecting its own independent compensation consultant. 45 The
court decided to deny the application of reliance provisions.4 6
40. See supra Section II.C.
41. See, e.g., Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R.
288, 307 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (adding that the opinion was based on the data
provided by the acquirer and thus some losses were understated).
42. Boyer v. Wilmington Materials, Inc., 754 A.2d 881, 910 (Del. Ch. 1999)
(finding that Section 14 1(e) is not a defense).
43. Cf James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest:
Empowering the Outside Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1077,

1086-87 (2003) (citing cases showing that, in the absence of signs of self-dealing,
plaintiffs' claims alleging that advisors were not independent from senior management
usually get dismissed).
44. 921 A.2d 732 (Del. Ch. 2007).
45. Further flaws in the procedure included the fact that the advisor based his
opinion on misleading information provided by management, that his report addressed
a different transaction from the one actually adopted, and that some of the committee's
members were interested in the transaction. Id. at 748, 751.
46. Id. at 751. Interestingly, the court did not just hold Section 14 1(e) inapplicable,
but added that in entire fairness cases, the existence of reasonable reliance, while being
a factor in evaluating whether directors have met the standard of fairness, is not
"outcome determinative of entire fairness" because this would replace the court's role
in determining entire fairness under Section 144 and would create a conflict between
Sections 141(e) and 144. In response to this view, Thomas A. Uebler notes that a court
should first assess the entire fairness of the transaction (and, in doing so, consider
various factors, among which is the use of advisors). Then, if the transaction has been
found to be unfair, the court should consider the Section 141(e) defense. Applying this
theory to the Valeant facts, and assuming that the transaction was found to be unfair,
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Delaware courts have assessed transactions in which advisors had a
personal stake in a business transaction. In In re Del Monte Foods Co.
ShareholdersLitigation, the court found that a financial advisor misled the
board of a company that private equity buyers were in the process of
acquiring.4 7 The advisor did not disclose to the board that the advisor
would participate in the buy-side financing and that the advisor actually
encouraged potential buyers even before its appointment as advisor. 4 8 The
board was unaware of the advisor's interactions with the potential buyers.
The court examined the breach of fiduciary duties for the purpose of
granting injunctive relief to delay the shareholder vote and did not examine
monetary liability, admitting that Sections 102(b)(7) 49 and 141(e) make the
chances of a judgment for money damages "vanishingly small."so In other
words, the Court implied that Section 141(e) applies despite the advisor's
interest in the transaction. This makes sense because undisclosed facts the
board could not have known do not undermine the reasonableness of the
Section 141(e) selection process. 5 1 To require that boards ask advisors to
disclose any conflicts of interest would exceed the reasonable inquiry a
board must make and render the Section 141(e) selection process highly
unpredictable. Requiring that boards ask advisors to disclose conflicts of
interest could eliminate, of course, the risk of injunctive relief. 5 2 Finally,
but Section 141(e) applied, the directors would have been required to disgorge the
unfair portion of the compensation, but, on the other hand, they would not have been
held liable for additional monetary damages flowing from breach of fiduciary duty.
See Uebler, supra note 24, at 1049, 1053. Furthermore, Professor Bainbridge, adopting
a somewhat different approach, concludes that the court's view in this case serves to
eviscerate Section 141(e), noting that a Section 141(e) report should indeed be
"outcome determinative." See Stephen Bainbridge, Eviscerating DGCL 141(e),
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Apr. 2, 2007), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/
professorbainbridgecom/2007/04/eviscerating-dgcl- 141 e.html.
47. In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011).
48. See id at 823 (noting that the board had previously called off the process of a
potential sale, and its investment bankers maintained contact with the potential buyers,
despite the confidentiality agreement).
49. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011); see Ryan ex rel. Maxim Integrated
Prods. v. Gifford, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1, at *23-24 n.27 (Del. Ch. Jan 2, 2009)
("Section 102(b)(7) allows companies to adopt a provision in their certificate that
eliminates the personal liability of directors for monetary damages for breach of
fiduciary duty as a director, except for, among other things, breaches of the duty of
loyalty and acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct.").
50. See In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., 25 A.3d at 818.

51. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262 (Del. 2000) ("[T]he faulty selection
process was attributable to the directors."); see also Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 16,
at 25 ("[I]f reasonable inquiry would not have disclosed the interest.").
52. See David A. Katz, Del Monte and the Responsibility of a Board in a Sales
Process, HARv. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 14, 2011),

http://blogs.law.harvard.edulcorpgov/2011/04/14/del-monte-and-the-responsibility-of-
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the court noted that, even if monetary liability is not an option,
disgorgement of transaction-related profits may be available as an
alternative remedy. This concept agrees with Uebler's above-mentioned
concept, according to which the applicability of Section 141(e) does not
undermine alternative remedies, such as the disgorgement of amounts
received as a result of an unfair transaction. 54
Another variation of having interest in the transaction arises when a
substantial part of the advisor's fee depends on the success of the
transaction (contingent fees). Delaware courts hold that the sole presence
of such a fee structure does not itself destroy the advisor's perceived
independence and that additional factors should be considered.5 5 As a
practical matter, prominent financial advisors normally would not risk their
reputation issuing inaccurate or incomplete advice.56
Finally, while courts have sporadically demonstrated a prejudice against
the independence of in-house counsels,57 the reputations of in-house legal
departments are rapidly improving.5 8 The general rule is that particularized
facts indicating bad faith or a flawed selection process are required to rebut
the presumption of disinterestedness. 59
III. FURTHER REQUIREMENTS

Beyond the expressly stated elements of Section 141(e), courts and
scholars set additional requirements for the application of the reliance
doctrine. Most notably, in Brehm v. Eisner,6o the Delaware Supreme Court

tried to systematize all basic requirements, stating that to reject reliance, a
complaint must:
allege particularized facts . . . that, if proved, would show, for example,

that: (a) the directors did not in fact rely on the expert; (b) their reliance
a-board-in-a-sales-process.
53. See In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., 25 A.3d at 838.

54. See Uebler, supra note 24.
55. See In re General Motors (Hughes) S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 20269, 2005
WL 1089021, at *14 n.143 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2005), aff'd, 897 A.2d 162 (Del. 2006)
(noting that the fee arrangement was unremarkable in terms of the overall value of the
transaction).
56. See Winters v. First Union Corp., No. 01-CVS-5362, 2001 WL 34000144, at *4
(N.C. Super. Ct. July 12, 2001) (noting further that contingent fee arrangements are
standard within the investment banking industry).
57. See In re Oracle Secs. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1189 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
("inherently biased counsel").
58. Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value

Creation, 33 J. CoRP. L. 497, 510 (2008).
59. See Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 16, at 26.
60. 746 A.2d 244, 262 (Del. 2000).
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was not in good faith; (c) they did not reasonably believe that the
expert's advice was within the expert's professional competence; (d) the
expert was not selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the
corporation, and the faulty selection process was attributable to the
directors; (e) the subject matter ... that was material and reasonably
available was so obvious that the board's failure to consider it was
grossly negligent regardless of the expert's advice or lack of advice; or
(f) that the decision of the Board was so unconscionable as to constitute
waste or fraud.61
Requirements (a) through (d) rephrase Section 141(e). The most crucial
requirement is (e) because it is the only one directly aimed at preventing
the blind adoption of experts' views, which, as noted at the beginning of
this Article, poses a significant problem for the reliance doctrine, due to the
psychological safety decision-makers seek. This Section will explore
further requirements that are thought to rationalize the reliance process. As
the wording of the above court decision implies, there is a presumption that
these requirements are met, meaning the plaintiff must present contrary

evidence. 6 2
A.

No Blind Reliance

According to the first requirement, the board should not blindly adopt
the advice given, i.e. without even trying to understand its basic logic. This
concept, though, is somewhat vague. A broad interpretation of this
requirement renders the reliance doctrine useless. Requiring, for example,
that directors familiarize themselves with all technical aspects of the advice
given would doubtlessly deviate from current business practices. Similarly,
requiring that they obtain all necessary information to be able to
independently assess the substance of the advice would severely undermine
the reliance doctrine and impose less than cost-effective duties. Besides,
under Delaware law, the sole ground deterring blind reliance can be found
in the (somewhat abstract) good-faith limitation incorporated in Section
141(e). Unlike the wording adopted in New York or, more explicitly, in
Australian law, there is no further limitation in the discussed statute. 6 3
61. Id.; see Ash v. McCall, No. Civ. A. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341, at *9 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 15, 2000).
62. See Ash, 2000 WL 1370341, at *9 ("The . . . board is entitled to the

presumption that it exercised proper business judgment, including proper reliance on
experts.")
63. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 717(a) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2010) ("[I]n so
relying he shall be acting in good faith and with such degree of care . . . .")(emphasis
added); see Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 275 (2d
Cir. 1986) (noting that directors have some oversight obligations to become reasonably

familiar with an opinion, report, or other source of advice before becoming entitled to
rely on it); see also CorporationsAct 2001, § 189(b) (Austl.) ("[If| the reliance was
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1. Smith v. Van Gorkom on Reliance
In the past, Delaware case law emphasized this element of the reliance
doctrine, notably in the groundbreaking decision Smith v. Van Gorkom. 4
At the time, Section 141(e) encompassed only reliance on a corporation's
own officials, accountants, and appraisers.s According to the court's
holding, certain circumstances may give rise to the director's duty to make
a "reasonable inquiry" into the reports submitted by officers.66 In Van
Gorkom, these circumstances included "hastily calling the meeting without
prior notice of its subject matter, the proposed sale of the Company without
any prior consideration of the issue or necessity therefor, the urgent time
constraints imposed by [a takeover specialist], and the total absence of any
documentation whatsoever .... 6" Although the directors had no financial
expertise, the court held that they could not reasonably have relied on the
reports in good faith if they accounted for all reasonably available
information.6 8 The board is "entitled to good faith, not blind, reliance., 69
2. Narrowing GoodFaith As Well As Oversight andRisk
Management Duties
After Smith v. Van Gorkom, Delaware courts severely narrowed
oversight and monitoring duties. Following Caremark, the court briefly
required a "sustained or systematic" failure to monitor.70 Stone v. Ritter
limited the scope of the duty to monitor, holding that liability is given only
if "(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information
system or controls or (b) having implemented such system or controls,
made after making an independent assessment of the information or advice, having
regard to the director's knowledge of the corporation and the complexity of the
structure and operations of the corporation . . . ."); Mark Byrne, Do Directors Need
Better Statutory Protection when Acting on the Advice of Others?, 21 AUSTL. J. CORP.

L. 238, 253 (2008) (proposing the relaxation of the terms of this provision by means of
requiring inquiry only "if the circumstances indicate the need for inquiry").
64. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
65. See 44 Del. Laws 423 (1943).
66. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875.

67. Id. (holding that (a) the CEO's oral presentation did not constitute "reports"
within the meaning of Section 141(e) (the current version of this provision includes,
though, "information, opinions, reports or statements"); (b) the presentation lacked
substance, since the CEO was "basically uninformed as to the essential provisions of
the very document about which he was talking"; and (c) the CFO's report did not enjoy
the status conferred by Section 141(e), since it was not pertinent as to the subject matter
upon which the board is called to act (in fact, it did not purport to be a valuation
study)).
68. Id at 877.
69. Id at 875.
70. See In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 963, 971 (Del.
Ch. 1996).
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The
[directors] consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations.
court also required that directors knew that they were not discharging their
fiduciary obligations.7 2 In interpreting these holdings, subsequent court
In Desimore v.
decisions adopted one of the following approaches.
Barrows and Wood v. Baum, the courts required facts showing that the
board actually knew-not should have known-that the internal controls of
the corporation were inadequate.74

In American International Group v.

Greenberg, the court inferred such knowledge from the positions of the
directors or officers in the company-which enabled the control of the
relevant corporate divisions-as well as from the persistence and the
magnitude of the fraudulent conduct. However, in In re Citigroup, Inc.
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, the court noted that American
International Group v. Greenberg involved pervasive fraudulent and
criminal conduct, as opposed to the failure to recognize the extent of the
company's business risk.76 To be liable for the latter, the court concluded
that bad faith must be proven based on the fact that the director knowingly
violated a fiduciary duty or demonstrated a conscious disregard for a
known duty.
Ignoring several red flags indicating deterioration of the
subprime mortgage market was insufficient for the duty to monitor to be
violated.78 With regard to the company's failure to disclose exposure to
subprime assets, the court rejected demand futility, noting that bad faith
would have been proven if plaintiffs demonstrated that directors knew that
there were misstatements or omissions in the financial statements.
71. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (emphasis in original).
Furthermore, the court viewed the duty to monitor as a subsidiary element of acting in
good faith, while it considered good faith, in turn, as a subsidiary element of the duty of
loyalty. Id at 368.
72. See id at 370.
73. See Eric J. Pan, A Board's Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 717, 733

(2009-10).
74. Desimore v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 940 (Del. Ch. 2007) (relating to

backdating of stock options); Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 139, 141 (Del. 2008)
(relating to inadequate accounting and financial-reporting controls).
75. 965 A.2d 763, 795-99 (Del. Ch. 2009) (relating inter alia to improper
accounting).
76. 964 A.2d 106, 130 (Del. Ch. 2009) (contrasting the alleged failure to monitor
and manage risks Citigroup faced in the context of subprime lending market as well as
disclosure failures).
77. Id. at 125.
78. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and EnterpriseRisk Management, 34 J.
CORP. L. 967, 990 (2009) (concluding that claims alleging risk management failure will
rarely result in liability).

79. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 133-34; see also Kevin F. Brady & Francis G.X.
Pileggi, Recent Key Delaware Corporateand Commercial Decisions, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. &

Bus. 421, 429 (2010) (summarizing the court's ruling on the plaintiff's demand futility
argument in In re Citigroup,Inc. ShareholderDerivativeLitigation).
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3. Impact on Reliance
The purpose of this review of recent Delaware decisions is to shed light
on the interpretation of good faith. Good faith, as noted, is the main
pathway to eliminate blind reliance cases under Delaware law.o When
interpreting "good faith" in Section 141(e), one should not disregard
current holdings of Delaware courts relating to this legal concept. In
particular, it is fair to speculate that Delaware courts would be unwilling to
construe a broad good faith requirement within the reliance framework that
would be actually incompatible with its general good faith perception.
Without claiming that the above decisions form a consistent and clear
system of rules, the bottom line is that unacceptable blind reliance in
Delaware should be limited to cases where directors exhibit bad faith by
means of (a) consciously disregarding their duties or (b) demonstrating
clearly egregious behavior, such as abdicating their responsibility to make
any business decision.81 At the same time, the court might weigh the
magnitude and persistence of the faulty behavior and the director's
personal characteristics-mainly the director's experience and position in
the company. 82 Therefore, as a rule, "should-have-known" cases do not
render reliance unwarranted, as long as the directors act in good faith.
Contrary interpretations would be inconsistent with the statute's wording,
according to which directors are "fully protected" as long as Section
141(e)'s conditions are met. They would also construe good faith
autonomously-that is, regardless of the court's interpretations in other
contexts involving bad faith. Therefore, courts will generally not deny
Section 141(e) applicability where the director negligently ignores some
obvious red flags8 3 or otherwise acts in a grossly negligent manner because
of the court's (pre-Caremark) holdings in Brehm v. Eisner and Ash v.
McCall that reliance is inapplicable where particularized facts show that
the issue was material and "so obvious that the board's failure to consider it
was grossly negligent regardless of the expert's advice or lack of advice." 84
80. See supra Section III.A.

81. Cf Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Serys., Inc. v.
Elkins, No. Civ. A. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290 *1, *10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004)
(interpreting "good faith" in the context of Section 102(b)(7)).
82. See In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 16415, 2004
WL 1305745, at *1, *39-40 (Del. Ch. June 4, 2004).
83. See id. at *4 (noting that the directors of an acquiring company ignored various
"red flags" including news articles and analysts' reports questioning the financial
situation of the company to be acquired). But see id at *9-10 (further noting that the
court was satisfied by reliance on experts and the "green flags" they provided and thus,
even from the perspective of Ash v. McCall, the "so-obvious" exception to reliance
should be strictly interpreted).
84. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262 (Del. 2000); Ash v. McCall, No. Civ.
A. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341, at *1, *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000).

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LA wREVIEW

340
4.

V 2:2
Vol.

Two Examples

To illustrate this set of rules, this Article considers two real-life
examples involving financial statements. The first shows what would not
occur in Delaware, and the second presents a realistic context of proper
reliance under Delaware law.
i.

ASIC v. Healey

The following facts took place in Australia, and the circumstances led to
the issuance of a well-discussed Federal Court decision entitled Australian
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) v. Healey, which was
signed by Justice Middleton." ASIC sued seven directors, six of whom
were non-executive, as well as the Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") of the
Centro Group over certain errors in the group's financial statements. In
particular, about $2 billion (AUD) of current liabilities had been
misclassified as non-current liabilities and, in addition, there was a failure
to disclose guarantees of short-term liabilities of an associated company of
about $1.75 billion (USD) that had been given after the balance date.
ASIC claimed that, in failing to notice such a significant error in the
statements, defendants breached their statutory duty of care and diligence
owed to the group's companies. 88 PricewaterhouseCoopers ("PwC"), a
qualified external auditor with complete access to all relevant information,
prepared the financial statements.89 At the same time, the CFO did not
warn the directors that there might be irregularities in the statements. The
directors, therefore, argued that they reasonably relied on the advice of
PwC and of management, adding that they took reasonable steps to ensure
that the company had all the necessary procedures and processes in place to
prevent such errors. 90 According to Justice Middleton, however, directors
(executive and non-executive) retain the ultimate responsibility for
financial reporting, and they should recognize the distinction between
85. Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v. Healey [2011] FCA 717 (Austl.), available at

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2011/717.html; see, e.g., John Lowry, The
Irreducible Core of the Duty of Care, Skill and Diligence of Company Directors:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey, 75 MOD. L. REv. 249
(2012) (evaluating the impact of the Australian Securitiesand Investments Commission

v. Healey decision on the standard of care required for non-executive directors in
monitoring the production of financial statements).
86. Healey, [2011] FCA 717, at TT 2-3.
87. Id. at 9.
88. Id. at 8.
89. Id. at

35.

90. David A. Katz, ForDirectors, A Wake-Up Callfrom Down Under, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 4, 2011, 9:21 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/10/04/for-directors-a-wake-up-call-fromdown-under/.
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current and non-current liabilities even if they are not experts in
accounting. 91
In addition, Justice Middleton described a set of
responsibilities of the board with regard to its duty to monitor. 9 2 Even
though he did not cite the reliance provision of Australian corporate law, it
appears that he adopted the provision's main requirement: boards need to
assess the advice independently; otherwise, the reliance defense does not
apply. 9 3 Finally, in a subsequent decision, Justice Middleton was satisfied
by a declaration of contravention signed by the non-executive directors and
did not impose further penalties.94
One could speculate that this result would not have occurred in
Delaware. 95 First and foremost, there was no evidence of bad faith, which
under Section 141(e) would render reliance unwarranted. As Justice
Middleton admitted, the directors reasonably expected that PwC would
provide sound advice, since no " 'red flags' ought to have alerted the
directors to deficiencies in the processes or personnel of Centro or its
auditors."96 Justice Middleton's notion that directors should have known of
the short-term debt and the guarantees is inconsistent with Delaware's
interpretation of oversight duties. Assuming that there is no "sustained or
systematic" failure to monitor, the Caremark-shapedduty to monitor would
not be violated. Consequently, Justice Middleton's finding that directors
are allowed to rely upon others-except where they know or, by the
exercise of ordinary care, should know facts that would deny reliance
seems to be incompatible with Section 141(e) and Delaware courts'

holdings. 97
91. Healey, [2011] FCA 717, at 1 18 ("[A] director, whatever his or her
background, has a duty greater than that of simply representing a particular field of
experience or expertise.").
92. Id. at 17 ("[A] director should acquire at least a rudimentary understanding of
the business of the corporation and become familiar with the fundamentals of the
business in which the corporation is engaged; a director should keep informed about
the activities of the corporation; whilst not required to have a detailed awareness of
day-to-day activities, a director should monitor the corporate affairs and policies; a
director should maintain familiarity with the financial status of the corporation by a
regular review and understanding of financial statements; a director, whilst not an
auditor, should still have a questioning mind.").
93. CorporationsAct 2001 (Cth) § 189(b) (Austl.); see also Byrne, supra note 63,
at 253.
94. See Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v. Healey (No. 2) [2011] FCA 1003,
188-91
(Austl.) (noting that damage to reputation is sufficient as a general deterrent). The
CEO and the CFO, however, incurred a monetary penalty and a temporary
disqualification ban, respectively. Id.
95. Here, this Article refers only to holdings of the court relating to reliance. The
rest of the court's holdings imposing heightened responsibilities on non-executive
directors do not correspond to practice in Delaware.
96. See Healey, [2011] FCA 717, at 384.
97. See id. at 167.
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ii. Chung v. Nara
The second set of facts is taken from Chung v. Nara Bancorp, a 2012
California Court of Appeals decision.98 The court, applying Delaware law,
dealt with a suit filed by Thomas Chung, the ex-chairman of the board of a
bank holding company, Nara Bancorp. The suit alleged breach of fiduciary
duties by the directors due to the restatement of certain financial
statements. It alleged that, in 2002, the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO")
prepared a letter stating that he would not withdraw half of the profit share
due to him in 2003 and 2004 in exchange for future compensation to avoid
falling short of analyst expectations.99 The 2002 financial statements did
not reflect the obligation to the CEO, according to this arrangement.100
Therefore, in 2005, the audit committee initiated an investigation
conducted by a law firm that was assisted by an accounting company.'ot
The law firm, the accounting company, and Nara's independent auditor
concluded that a restatement of the 2002 financial statements was
advisable. Accordingly, the board issued a restatement.' 02 Subsequently,
within the framework of an arbitration initiated by Nara against the CEO, it
was held that there was no need to restate the statements.o 3 In 2008, the
board decided not to restate (again) the statements and not to sue its
advisors. According to the plaintiff, this inaction also constituted a breach
of fiduciary duties. 104
The court noted that both Sections 102(b)(7) and 141(e) are statutory
defenses implicating the concept of good faith.105 Bad faith, in turn, is not
established by showing instances of gross negligence, but, according to
Walt Disney, presupposes more acute forms of misbehavior, such as a
conscious disregard for known duties. 10 6 Since the business judgment rule
does not always protect an irrational and grossly negligent decision, the
question that arises is whether the two statutory defenses impose a higher
hurdle to liability than the business judgment rule. The California court
explicitly affirms this to be the case.10 7 Accordingly, the court held that "it
98. No. B229826, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 842, at *1 (Cal. App. Feb. 1,
2012).
99. Id. at *2.
100. Id. at *3.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *4.
103. Id. at *7.
104. Id. at *8.
105. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7), 14 1(e).
106. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006); see
also Chung, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 842, at * 14.
107. Chung, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 842, at *14 ("[A]n irrational and grossly
negligent decision may not be protected by the business judgment rule, but it could
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is unreasonable to infer that the 2005 Directors consciously disregarded
duties or risks when they made their decision to issue the restatement only
after hundreds of hours of investigation and only after receiving advice
from competent professionals." 0 8 In other words, the court refused to
accept bad faith.
Therefore, the court concluded that Section 141(e) shields directors from
liability,109 since there was no evidence that the directors acted "for a
purpose other than advancing the best interests of Nara or [that they]
intentionally fail[ed] to act in the face of a known duty to act[.]"' 0 It also
determined that the directors had not "act[ed] with the intent to violate the
law[.]""' It was undisputed that the advisors had the "requisite expertise to
conduct the investigation," "that they were selected with reasonable care,"
and that the directors "in fact relied on the recommendation of [the
advisors]." 1 l2 In fact, the court referred to the elements of Section 141(e),
and, as far as the good faith element is concerned, it adopted the Delaware
interpretation. 113

Finally, with regard to the 2008 directors, the court was satisfied by the
defendants' declaration that they "exercised their business judgment in
making post arbitration decisions, and that they relied on management and
legal counsel to make all legally necessary public disclosures about the
arbitration."ll 4 The same statutory defenses, therefore, protected the
directors.1 15

iii. Comparing the Outcomes of the Two Cases

While both cases relate to financial statements, the behavior of the
Delaware directors sounds less outrageous. First, the misstatement in the
Australia case involved a very substantial sum of money ($2 billion AUD).
Second, the Australian directors failed to deal with a very central
accounting topic, namely the characterization of liabilities as short term,
while the Delaware directors were confronted with a disputed issue. Third,
Delaware directors consciously adopted the unanimous view of three
independent experts, while the Australian ones just listened to their
accountant.
very well be protected by an applicable statutory defense.").
108. Id.at *21.
109. Id. at *22.

110. Id. at *15.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id
Id
Id. at *12-15.
Id. at *23.
Id. at *25.
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On the other hand, for directors, especially for those with no significant
financial literacy, there is no meaningful difference between the Australia
and the Delaware case: in both cases, they relied on their qualified experts.
Since PwC, one of the most well-known accounting companies, failed to
spot the irregularity in the statements, the same occurred with non-experts
directors.
Imposing liability on directors-especially non-executive
directors whose duties are mainly supervisory-renders directorship a
hazardous job. That is supposedly why Justice Middleton ultimately
decided that reputation damages were a sufficient penalty for non-executive
directors. He found these directors to be "intelligent, experienced and
conscientious people" who undertook their duties honestly, leading him to
the conclusion that "they are not people from whom the public must be
protected in the future."" 6 Justice Middleton, in other words, imposed the
most important penalty Delaware directors face, reputation damages.
While the Australia and Delaware statutes differ significantly, they both
fail to address all possible issues. Ideally, in assessing reliance, a court
should weigh all available information, especially the expertise of the
director, the magnitude and nature of the misbehavior, the expert selection
process, the efforts to understand the opinion, and then choose a suitable
penalty from the ones available in the relevant jurisdiction (declaration of
contravention, disqualification, monetary liability, etc.). The good faith
requirement in Section 141(e) is too abstract to capture all thinkable sets of
facts, while the independent inquiry requirement of the Australian law is
too harsh.' 17 As the cases examined in this Article show, courts are flexible
enough in their effort to reach a fair result.
5. Remaining Uncertainties
The Smith v. Van Gorkom holding requiring a reasonable inquiry into the
reports submitted by officers (and, inferably, by outside experts) does not
correspond to Section 141(e)'s wording and recent judgments relating to
good faith.' 18 Generally, courts will not condemn "blind reliance"-even if
there are signs of grossly negligent behavior-as long as the statutory
requirements are met. "Good faith" is interpreted relatively narrowly,
according to Delaware court decisions.
One should take note, however, that Smith v. Van Gorkom involved an
extremely important transaction, namely the acquisition of the company
through a cash-out merger. In the context of transactions involving
corporate control, the subsequent Revlon decision imposed enhanced
judicial scrutiny that greatly affected the application of the business
116. Ausil. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v. Healey (No. 2), [2011] FCA 1003
117. CorporationsAct 2001 pt. 2D.1, div. 1, § 189(b) (Austl.).
118. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985).

184 (Austl.).
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judgment rule in such transactions.' 19 The reliance doctrine could not have
been left untouched. On the one hand, various decisions, mainly from the
1980's, required that boards actively participate in and oversee the
transaction, even if they act according to advisors' opinions.1 2 0 These
decisions also questioned the quality of fairness opinions provided by
investment banks when their preparation was obviously deficient.121 On
the other hand, there are numerous cases where courts, without citing
Section 141(e), treat fairness opinions as a serious indicator that directors
properly acted in approving the relevant transaction. 12 2 Consequently,
fairness opinions are an element supporting that the director was not
"grossly negligent" in informing himself, and therefore that business
judgment presumption applies. Section 141(e) as a defense is usually not
dealt with or is seen as inapplicable in gross negligence cases. 123 Without
asserting that Section 141(e) is the appropriate tool to deal with the
complexities of fairness opinions, it is clear that there are a lot of
uncertainties, which this Article will not address.
B. Should the Advice Be Written and Formally Presented?

The court in Smith v. Van Gorkom was not satisfied by an oral
presentation; it required a written report to fulfill Section 141(e)'s
dictate. 124
Since the current version of this provision includes
119. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184-85

(Del. 1986).
120. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1281 (Del. 1988)
(holding that "in a matter as significant as the sale of corporate control," directors
cannot avoid an "active and direct duty of oversight" simply by conditioning the
transaction on the outsider's opinion); see also In re Healthco Int'l, Inc., 208 B.R. 288,
305-06 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 369 (Del.
1993); William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Function Over Form: A
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW.

1287, 1300 (2001) ("[O]utside directors who had approved an arm's-length-negotiated
sale of their company to an unrelated third party, in reliance upon the advice of
independent counsel and investment bankers, were found to be ... grossly negligent for
not having "shopped" the company before agreeing to the sale .... ).
121. See Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 344 (Del. Ch. 1984) (criticizing
opinions that were prepared in a very short period of time); accord Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983).
122. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 1557,

1599 n.221 (2006).
123. See, e.g., Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 366; see also Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P.
v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 985 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("Section 141(e) of Delaware's
corporation law provides that directors are protected from a breach of the duty of care
'when the directors reasonably believe the information upon which they rely has been
presented by an expert 'selected with reasonable care' and is within that person's
'professional or expert competence.' ").
124. 488 A.2d 858, 884 (Del. 1985).
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"information, opinions, reports or statements," one could hardly argue that
oral presentations are unacceptable only because of their oral nature.125 Of
course, directors might prefer written reports, since judicial review will be

easier.12 6
Similarly, there is no need for a formal presentation to the board of
The wording of Section 141(e) ("presented to the
directors. 127
corporation") does not exclude written presentations but requires some
form of presentation. If the director fails to attend oral presentations or
does not read the reports, it could be argued that there was no stricto sensu
reliance-that is, an act based on the advice.' 2 8
C. Waste or Fraud
Decisions of the board "so unconscionable as to constitute waste or
fraud" are not excused by reliance.12 9 There is no need to expand Section
141(e), since bad faith covers both concepts. With regard to fraud, that is
obvious. In considering waste, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that
waste constitutes bad faith.'" It should be noted, however, that waste will
rarely be found. If "there is any substantialconsideration received by the
125. See Uebler, supra note 24, at 1037-38 ("[P]urpose of the 1987 amendment was
'to clarify that directors may rely in good faith upon .

.

. written or oral advice or

opinions of any professionals and experts . . . .' ").
126. See Carlton Invs. v. TLC Beatrice Int'l Holdings, No. Civ. A. 13950, 1997 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 86, at *54 (Del. Ch. May 30, 1997) ("[A]lthough a written legal opinion is
preferable from the standpoint of a court engaged in a post facto review of a board's
decision, whether an opinion is oral or in writing is of no consequence to the board at
the time of its decision."); see also Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 16, at 33.
127. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 769 n.550, aff'd,
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("Nor is it necessary for an expert to make a formal
presentation at the committee meeting in order for the board to rely on that expert's
analysis, although that certainly would have been the better course of action.").
128. See In re Healthco Int'l, Inc., 208 B.R. 288, 307 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) ("The
defendants say they relied on the solvency opinions of Valuation Research Corporation.
But they never saw those opinions before approving the transaction, so the opinions
can hardly constitute 'reports' of an expert the directors were entitled to rely upon
under section 14 1(e) of Delaware's corporation law."); MODEL. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.,
§ 8.30(e), at 8-202 (2011 Revision) ("Reliance ... is permitted only if the director has
read the information, opinion, report or statement in question, or was present at a
meeting at which it was orally presented, or took other steps to become generally
familiar with it."). However, as this Article notes previously, a director who read the
report but failed to familiarize himself with it loses the reliance defense only in badfaith cases.
129. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262 (Del. 2000).
130. See In re Citigroup, Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 136 (Del.
Ch. 2009) (quoting White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 n.36 (Del. 2001)) ("To prevail
on a waste claim ... the plaintiff must overcome the general presumption of good faith
by showing that the board's decision was so egregious or irrational that it could not
have been based on a valid assessment of the corporation's best interests.").
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corporation, and if there is a goodfaith judgment that in the circumstances
the transaction is worthwhile, there should be no finding of waste," and
Section 141(e) will be applicable.' 3 1
D. Full Disclosure

Even before the enactment of Section 141(e) and MBCA Section 8.30(e)
in their current versions, courts unanimously held that the reliance defense
is not available to directors who fail to disclose all relevant facts to their
advisor.132 For example, factual distortions calculated to result in favorable
advice clearly violate good faith principles and thus exclude the use of the
defense.' 33 Similarly, withholding from advisors facts that the director
thinks are relevant can be a "clear indication of bad faith."1 34 For example,
directors of an oil company should disclose material, non-public
information on the value of probable oil reserves to an investment banker;
otherwise, the fairness opinion is deficient. 13 5 Due to Section 141(e)'s
wording, it is unclear whether an honest, but grossly negligent failure to
disclose some facts taints the defense. This would be the case when the
director, due to the complexity of the issues involved, fails to recognize
which facts are relevant. If this failure is not attributed to negligence, the
omission would be "innocent."1 3 6 If the failure is attributed to gross
negligence, but the director acts in good faith, the result of a strict
interpretation of Section 141(e) would not exclude reliance. The exercise
of the advisor's duty, though, to ask appropriate questions to receive the
necessary information might prevent some of these cases of gross

negligence.137
131. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (emphasis in original).
132. Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 16, at 29 (regarding disclosure to attorneys).
133. Comment, Reliance on Advice of Counsel, 70 YALE L.J. 978, 989 (1961).
134. Id. at 981; see also Uebler, supra note 24, at 1044 ("[A]nything less than full
disclosure by the directors to the expert of all material facts related to the subject of the
expert advice might evidence bad faith.").
135. Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 341 (Del. Ch. 1984).
136. Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 16, at 29 (noting that requiring negligence is
consistent with the general structure of the defense, since, for example, directors are
shielded if they reasonably believe in the advisor's competence).
137. Id. at 29 n. 116; Longstreth, supra note 39, at 1192. For example, a bankruptcy
court examining a fraudulent transfer was not satisfied by reliance on a solvency
opinion issued by a consulting firm where this firm (a) would receive the larger part of
its payment only if it issued a favorable opinion and (b) relied on the outdated
projections provided by the management-as well as on management's "downside"
models-without making an independent inquiry. In re TOUSA, Inc., 422 B.R. 783,
839-40 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009), rev'd, In re TOUSA, Inc., 444 B.R. 613 (S.D. Fla.
2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part 680 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012). But see Jeffrey
Rothschild, Court Rulings on Solvency and FairnessOpinions Help to Define Liability

for

Financial Advisors,

MCDERMOTT

WILL

&

EMERY

(Feb.

2010),
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A variation of the lack of disclosure problem arises when CEOs
entrusted with the transmission of information to the expert manipulate the
information to prevent undesirable reports.' 3 8 Clearly, Section 141(e) does
not deal with that problem in its entirety. As noted previously, there is no
prejudice against experts selected by management.139 Nevertheless, since
boards are required to demonstrate reasonable care when selecting
advisors, they should not allow conflicted managers to select experts and
control the flow of information between the corporation and the experts. In
the presence of instances justifying a particular interest of managers in the
transaction (when, for example, they are to receive a large bonus or benefit
upon the consummation of a deal), directors should prevent them from
hiring a "friendly" advisor, or at least ensure that the advisor receives all
necessary information, in order to be able to enjoy the benefits of Section
141(e). In the absence of such circumstances, reliance is considered
warranted.140 Therefore, Section 141(e) fails to address the incentives of
managers, who, without being conflicted, try to manipulate the information
experts receive. Managers attempting to escape the board's oversight by
relying on expert opinions will usually be ineffective.'41
E. CausalNexus
Opinions that are not pertinent to the decision to be made 4 2 are not
covered by Section 141(e) because there is no stricto sensu "reliance."
Generally, for liability to be precluded there must be a causal nexus
between the challenged aspect of the transaction and the advice.14 3
Sometimes, causal nexus theories may benefit the recipient of the advice,
http://www.mwe.com/info/pubs/CRI_3%201 _Rothschild.pdf (noting that in various
cases courts were unwilling to hold financial advisors liable for fairness opinions, when
limitation on liability is explicitly stated in engagement letters).
138. See Nina Walton, Delegated Monitoring: When Can Boards Rely on Outside

Experts?, 14 Am. L. ECON. REv. 271, 277, 294 (2012) (concluding that, to eliminate the
incentives of managers to manipulate experts, boards should ask for joint
recommendations signed by both managers and experts).
139. See supra Section IID.
140. Cf Cox, supra note 43, at 1090 ("Though there is always the fear that
managerial self-interest will corrupt the information that reaches the board, absent
notice to the contrary, boards are entitled to rely upon reports prepared by managers
and their stewards unless the directors are aware of circumstances that make such
reliance unreasonable.").
141. See Walton, supra note 138, at 275, 299; see also Valeant Pharms. Int'l v.
Jemey, 921 A.2d 732, 751 (Del. Ch. 2007).
142. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875 (Del. 1985); see also Valeant
Pharms. Int'l, 921 A.2d at 751.

143. Uebler, supra note 24, at 1045-46 ("There may be no causal nexus, however,
where, with respect to a fairness opinion by a financial expert, the unfairness of the
transaction relates to process (e.g., timing or structure) and not to price.").
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for example when there is failure to disclose all facts to the expert, but the
challenged aspect of the transaction does not relate to the undisclosed facts.
F.

ContractualRelationship

A direct contractual relationship between the company and the advisor is
not required,144 provided, of course, that the advisor is selected with
reasonable care and directors act in good faith. 145 The board may equally
rely on the accounting company engaged by the company's law firm,146 on
the legal advisor of the underwriter, 147 or on the expert engaged by another
company participating in a common project or joint venture. However,
according to Section 141(e), there has to be some kind of presentation to
the board, such as a written report by the expert. Furthermore, it is
questionable whether a total stranger can present to the corporation
information, opinions, reports, or statements within the meaning of Section
141(e). Consequently, published articles of experts or published ratings
cannot be used to invoke a Section 141(e) defense. 148 Thus, a board
approving investments in highly rated investment products may allege that
it was not grossly negligent in informing itself, but it cannot invoke Section
141(e).
CONCLUSION
In all walks of corporate life-from creation to expansion and from
restructuring to demolition-experts are available to advise all playersdirectors, managers, shareholders, financiers, etc. Section 141(e) does not
regulate the role of experts, but only the conditions under which reliance on
them is statutorily protected. This Section, specifically the part relating to
experts, does not come into play as often as one would imagine. First, it
applies only to directors. Second, when it comes to liability, directors are
shielded by various alternative mechanisms, ranging from the business
judgment presumption and the Section 102(b)(7) exculpatory clause to
indemnification and D&O insurance provisions.149 At the same time, when
Section 102(b)(7) is inapplicable due to the bad faith of the director,
144. See MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT § 8.30(f)(2)

("persons retained by the

corporation"). This wording invites contrary interpretations.
145. See supra Section II.B, II.D.
146. Chung v. Nara Bancorp, No. B229826, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 842, at
*3 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2012).
147. Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 16, at 26-27.

148. Cf Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The Audit Committee's Ethical and Legal
Responsibilities: The State Law Perspective, 47 S. TEX. L. REv. 27, 31 (2005) (noting
that reliance on a CFO's views as reported in an interview with a newspaper is not
appropriate).
149. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,

§§

102(b)(7), 145(a), 145(g).
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Section 141(e) will not usually be applicable either. Therefore, Section
141(e) would be useful for the director, for instance, in the event of
conflicted transactions or when there is gross negligence in the information
gathering process and no Section 102(b)(7) protection is in place.
In such cases, unfortunately, the holdings of Delaware courts are not
completely consistent. One would expect that the elements of Section
141(e) would provide satisfactory (and exclusive) guidance to the courts,
but the courts often are either indecisive with regard to the interpretation of
the good faith element, add extra elements to the rule, or do not cite Section
141(e) at all. While, for example, a court decision inferred from the
particular qualifications of a director that he "should have known," another
decision stated that even directors who are experts are fully protected under
Section 141(e). 5 0 Most importantly, although the provision does not
require directors to conduct an independent inquiry, Delaware courts,
especially in merger and conflicted transactions, (a) require boards to be
active,' 5 ' (b) take into account facts the directors did not know'5 2 or could
not have known, (c) consider reliance inapplicable when "the subject
matter that was material and reasonably available was so obvious that the
board's failure to consider it was grossly negligent regardless of the
expert's advice or lack of advice,"',5 3 or (d) consider reliance as "a pertinent
factor in evaluating whether corporate directors have met a standard of
fairness in their dealings with respect to corporate powers." 54 While not
resolving all uncertainties, this Article concludes that, according to the
wording of Section 141(e), and taking into account Caremark,'5 5 Delaware
courts are expected to interpret this provision as the Chung v. Nara court
did.15 6 Accordingly, Section 141(e) is construed as a "standalone" defense,
which can shield grossly negligent directors even when they are not
protected by the business judgment presumption.
Had the Wisconsin schools been a Delaware corporation, its directors
would probably have been fully protected by both the business judgment
presumption and the reliance provision. Of course, in Delaware there are
alternative mechanisms, most notably reputational mechanisms that could
150. See In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 135 (Del. Ch.
2009).
151. See supra Section III.A.5.
152. See Valeant Pharms. Int'l v. Jemey, 921 A.2d 732, 751 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(admitting that the board probably did not know that the advisor had already issued an

opinion favoring the award of bonuses).
153. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262 (Del. 2000).
154. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1142 (Del. Ch. 1994),
aff'd, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995); see also Valeant Pharms. Int'l, 921 A.2d at 751.
155. See supra Section III.A.2.
156. See supra Section III.A.4.ii.
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have affected their behavior. "In Delaware," as two Delaware attorneys put
it, "the answer is not to expand their personal liability."' 5 7

157. See generally Dominick T. Gattuso & Vernon R. Proctor, Reining in Directors
and Officers in CorporateAmerica, 19 Bus. L. TODAY 1 (Jan./Feb. 2010). However,

even from a reputation perspective, this does not mean that there is no need for more
predictable rules. For directors, even having to participate in a trial might (at least
temporarily) damage their reputation.

At

